Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks

We introduce a model in which agents in a network can trade via bilateral contracts. We find that when continuous transfers are allowed and utilities are quasi-linear, the full substitutability of preferences is sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes for any underlying network stru...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 121
Main Author: Hatfield, J
Kominers, S
Nichifor, A
Ostrovsky, M
Westkamp, A.C
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: CHICAGO University of Chicago Press 01.10.2013
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
published in: The Journal of political economy Vol. 121; no. 5; pp. 966 - 1005
Related: Microeconomics & Public Economics
RS: GSBE ETBC
ORCID: 0000-0002-3339-5059
0000-0002-7608-6619
Data of publication: 20131001
ISSN: 0022-3808
1537-534X
EISSN: 1537-534X
Discipline: Economics
Political Science
Subjects:
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: NARCIS
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Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2013
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