Governator vs. Hunter and Aggregator: A simulation of party competition with vote-seeking and office-seeking rules

The policy positions parties choose are central to both attracting voters and forming coalition governments. How then should parties choose positions to best represent voters? Laver and Sergenti show that in an agent-based model with boundedly rational actors a decision rule (Aggregator) that takes...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 13
Main Author: Lehrer, R
Schumacher, G
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC LIBRARY SCIENCE 02.02.2018
Public Library of Science
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
published in: PloS one Vol. 13; no. 2; p. e0191649
Editor: Zia, Asim
Related: Challenges to Democratic Representation
ORCID: 0000-0002-6503-4514
Data of publication: 2018-02-02
ISSN: 1932-6203
1932-6203
EISSN: 1932-6203
Alternate Title: Governator vs. Hunter and Aggregator
Discipline: Sciences (General)
Bibliography: Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
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