Selfish punishers

We show that a second-party punisher forces his peers to contribute to a public good while contributing significantly less himself. This effect increased over time and casts doubt on the prevalent prosocial interpretation of (designated) punishment behavior. •Designated punishers mitigate free ridin...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	157
Main Author:	Hoeft, Leonard Mill, Wladislaw
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Place of publication:	Elsevier B.V 01.08.2017
published in:	Economics letters Vol. 157; pp. 41 - 44
Data of publication:	August 2017
ISSN:	0165-1765 1873-7374
EISSN:	1873-7374
Discipline:	Economics
Subjects:	Punishment Selfish Experiment Public good Punishment Selfish H41 Experiment K42 C92 Public good
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	CrossRef Database information Databases - DBIS