Selfish punishers

We show that a second-party punisher forces his peers to contribute to a public good while contributing significantly less himself. This effect increased over time and casts doubt on the prevalent prosocial interpretation of (designated) punishment behavior. •Designated punishers mitigate free ridin...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 157
Main Author: Hoeft, Leonard
Mill, Wladislaw
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: Elsevier B.V 01.08.2017
published in: Economics letters Vol. 157; pp. 41 - 44
Data of publication: August 2017
ISSN: 0165-1765
EISSN: 1873-7374
Discipline: Economics
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: CrossRef
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