On the sustainability of bargaining solutions in family decision models

Sustainability in family decision models

This paper analyses the sustainability of family bargaining agreements by developing a non-cooperative game between two spouses with symmetric preferences. To that end, we develop, by using a general utility function, a repeated non-cooperative game involving two players with symmetric preferences,...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 5
Main Author: Andaluz, Joaquín
Molina, José Alberto
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: Boston Springer US 01.12.2007
Springer
published in: Review of economics of the household Vol. 5; no. 4; pp. 405 - 418
Data of publication: 20071200
ISSN: 1569-5239
1573-7152
EISSN: 1573-7152
Discipline: Economics
Subjects:
J12
C71
C62
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: CrossRef
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
Database information Databases - DBIS