Asymmetric information in external versus internal promotions

Employers have an incentive to fill managerial positions with the most able candidates, and they face a central choice of promoting from inside or outside the firm. With respect to the observability of the candidates' quality, individual and job-specific characteristics might exert differential...

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Bibliographic details
Volume:	59
Main Author:	Bossler, Mario Grunau, Philipp
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	HEIDELBERG PHYSICA-VERLAG GMBH & CO 01.12.2020 Springer
published in:	Empirical economics Vol. 59; no. 6; pp. 2977 - 2998
Data of publication:	2020-12-01
ISSN:	0377-7332 1435-8921
EISSN:	1435-8921
Discipline:	Economics
Subjects:	Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods Employers Analysis Research institutes RECRUITMENT WAGES Promotions CAREERS STICKY FLOORS PERFORMANCE SENIORITY EARNINGS FIRMS MODEL Asymmetric information Statistical discrimination Signaling GENDER
Online Access:	Fulltext
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index – 2020 Web of Knowledge Web of Science CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS