Asymmetric information in external versus internal promotions

Employers have an incentive to fill managerial positions with the most able candidates, and they face a central choice of promoting from inside or outside the firm. With respect to the observability of the candidates' quality, individual and job-specific characteristics might exert differential...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 59
Main Author: Bossler, Mario
Grunau, Philipp
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: HEIDELBERG PHYSICA-VERLAG GMBH & CO 01.12.2020
published in: Empirical economics Vol. 59; no. 6; pp. 2977 - 2998
Data of publication: 2020-12-01
ISSN: 0377-7332
EISSN: 1435-8921
Discipline: Economics
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index – 2020
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