The central government grant allocation problem in the presence of misrepresentation and cheating

This study deals with the central government grant allocation problem under conditions of asymmetric information. Using a simple model, we examine herein the optimal design of random audit and incentive mechanisms to encourage the grantee (the local government authority) to report truthfully on loca...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 5
Main Author: Gilbert, Guy
Rocaboy, Yvon
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer-Verlag 01.07.2004
published in: Economics of governance Vol. 5; no. 2; pp. 137 - 147
Data of publication: 20040700
ISSN: 1435-6104
EISSN: 1435-8131
Discipline: Economics
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: CrossRef
Database information Databases - DBIS