Delegation, Union Leaders and Capital Allocation

This paper looks upon the effects of delegation of the bargaining process within unions. It investigates the allocation of capital when investment is sunk and there is an absence of binding contracts. Although capital investment is inefficient, capital allocation can be improved by precommitment. St...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 11
Main Author: Skåtun, John Douglas F
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 01.07.1997
published in: Labour (Rome, Italy) Vol. 11; no. 2; pp. 249 - 264
Data of publication: July 1997
ISSN: 1121-7081
1467-9914
EISSN: 1467-9914
Discipline: Economics
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: CrossRef
Database information Databases - DBIS