Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation

A large population of fixed-type agents engage in exclusive pairwise relationships in a decentralized setting. At the onset, agents randomly meet in pairs under private information of individual time-invariant types. They play a voluntary contribution game. At the end of the first period, members of...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	46
Main Author:	Chillemi, Ottorino Gui, Benedetto Rocco, Lorenzo
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01.08.2017 SPRINGER HEIDELBERG Springer
published in:	International journal of game theory Vol. 46; no. 3; pp. 737 - 760
ORCID:	0000-0002-4034-3724
Data of publication:	20170800
ISSN:	0020-7276 1432-1270
EISSN:	1432-1270
Discipline:	Economics Mathematics Political Science
Subjects:	Economics Dynamic agency Behavioral/Experimental Economics Endogenous selection Local information Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Operation Research/Decision Theory Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Delegation D83 D82 Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications Statistics & Probability Physical Sciences Social Sciences Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods Business & Economics Mathematics Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences Science & Technology Charitable contributions Analysis Dynamic agency IMPERFECT COMMITMENT Endogenous selection Local information Delegation REVELATION PRINCIPLE
Online Access:	Fulltext
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Science Citation Index Expanded - 2017 Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2017 Web of Knowledge Science Citation Index Expanded Web of Science CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS