Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation
A large population of fixed-type agents engage in exclusive pairwise relationships in a decentralized setting. At the onset, agents randomly meet in pairs under private information of individual time-invariant types. They play a voluntary contribution game. At the end of the first period, members of...
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Volume: | 46 |
---|---|
Main Author: |
Chillemi, Ottorino
Gui, Benedetto Rocco, Lorenzo |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Zielgruppe: |
Academic |
Place of publication: |
Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01.08.2017 SPRINGER HEIDELBERG Springer |
published in: | International journal of game theory Vol. 46; no. 3; pp. 737 - 760 |
ORCID: |
0000-0002-4034-3724 |
Data of publication: | 20170800 |
ISSN: |
0020-7276 1432-1270 |
EISSN: |
1432-1270 |
Discipline: | Economics Mathematics Political Science |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: |
Fulltext |
Database: | Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Science Citation Index Expanded - 2017 Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2017 Web of Knowledge Science Citation Index Expanded Web of Science CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS |