Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation

A large population of fixed-type agents engage in exclusive pairwise relationships in a decentralized setting. At the onset, agents randomly meet in pairs under private information of individual time-invariant types. They play a voluntary contribution game. At the end of the first period, members of...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 46
Main Author: Chillemi, Ottorino
Gui, Benedetto
Rocco, Lorenzo
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01.08.2017
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
Springer
published in: International journal of game theory Vol. 46; no. 3; pp. 737 - 760
ORCID: 0000-0002-4034-3724
Data of publication: 20170800
ISSN: 0020-7276
1432-1270
EISSN: 1432-1270
Discipline: Economics
Mathematics
Political Science
Subjects:
D83
D82
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Science Citation Index Expanded - 2017
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2017
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