Information Management and Incentives

We ask how the incentives of an agent are affected by an information management system that lets the agent receive information about the performance of a colleague before (“transparent firm”) rather than after he provides effort (“nontransparent firm”). Transparency is detrimental for incentives if...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 22
Main Author: Nafziger, Julia
Schumacher, Heiner
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Inc Spring 2013
WILEY-BLACKWELL
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
published in: Journal of economics & management strategy Vol. 22; no. 1; pp. 140 - 163
ORCID: 0000-0003-3307-3073
Data of publication: Spring 2013
ISSN: 1058-6407
1530-9134
EISSN: 1530-9134
Discipline: Economics
Business
Bibliography: The authors thank Daniel Spulber, an associate editor, two anonymous referees, as well as Estelle Cantillon, Peter Ove Christensen, Julio Davila, Mathias Dewatripont, Guido Friebel, Hans Frimor, Paul Heidhues, Ian Jewitt, Georg Kirchsteiger, Alexander Koch, Patrick Legros, Sandra Ludwig, Margaret Meyer, Burkhard Schipper, and Urs Schweizer for valuable comments and discussions. Part of this research was conducted while the first author visited the IDEI in Toulouse and Nuffield College, University of Oxford. She thanks these institutions for their kind hospitality.
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Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
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