Information Management and Incentives
We ask how the incentives of an agent are affected by an information management system that lets the agent receive information about the performance of a colleague before (“transparent firm”) rather than after he provides effort (“nontransparent firm”). Transparency is detrimental for incentives if...
|Place of publication:||
Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Inc Spring 2013
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
|published in:||Journal of economics & management strategy Vol. 22; no. 1; pp. 140 - 163|
|Data of publication:||Spring 2013|
The authors thank Daniel Spulber, an associate editor, two anonymous referees, as well as Estelle Cantillon, Peter Ove Christensen, Julio Davila, Mathias Dewatripont, Guido Friebel, Hans Frimor, Paul Heidhues, Ian Jewitt, Georg Kirchsteiger, Alexander Koch, Patrick Legros, Sandra Ludwig, Margaret Meyer, Burkhard Schipper, and Urs Schweizer for valuable comments and discussions. Part of this research was conducted while the first author visited the IDEI in Toulouse and Nuffield College, University of Oxford. She thanks these institutions for their kind hospitality.
|Database:||Social Sciences Citation Index
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