More Dispersion, Higher Bonuses? On Differentiation in Subjective Performance Evaluations

We investigate the claim that supervisors do not differentiate enough between high- and low-performing employees when evaluating performance. In a first step, this claim is illustrated in a formal model showing that rating compression reduces performance and subsequent bonus payments. The effect dep...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 36
Main Author: Kampkötter, Patrick
Sliwka, Dirk
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Trade
Academic
Place of publication: CHICAGO University of Chicago Press 01.04.2018
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
published in: Journal of labor economics Vol. 36; no. 2; pp. 511 - 549
Data of publication: 20180401
ISSN: 0734-306X
1537-5307
EISSN: 1537-5307
Discipline: Economics
Subjects:
PAY
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index – 2018
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