More Dispersion, Higher Bonuses? On Differentiation in Subjective Performance Evaluations

We investigate the claim that supervisors do not differentiate enough between high- and low-performing employees when evaluating performance. In a first step, this claim is illustrated in a formal model showing that rating compression reduces performance and subsequent bonus payments. The effect dep...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	36
Main Author:	Kampkötter, Patrick Sliwka, Dirk
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Trade Academic
Place of publication:	CHICAGO University of Chicago Press 01.04.2018 UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
published in:	Journal of labor economics Vol. 36; no. 2; pp. 511 - 549
Data of publication:	20180401
ISSN:	0734-306X 1537-5307
EISSN:	1537-5307
Discipline:	Economics
Subjects:	Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences Industrial Relations & Labor Payment Employee performance Analysis Bonuses INTRAFIRM WAGE DISPERSION TOURNAMENT INDICATORS ORGANIZATIONS COMPETITION PRODUCTIVITY PAY RECIPROCITY FIRM PERFORMANCE EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index – 2018 Web of Knowledge Web of Science CrossRef Gale General OneFile (A&I only) Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS