Efficient v.s. equilibrium unemployment with match-specific costs

This paper extends the standard matching model by adding match-specific costs, which can only be partially protected from hold-up because of workers' bargaining power. We show that a decrease in equilibrium unemployment might improve welfare for realistic values of workers' bargaining powe...

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Bibliographic details
Volume:	88
Main Author:	Cheron, A
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 2005 ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA Elsevier
published in:	Economics letters Vol. 88; no. 2; pp. 176 - 183
Data of publication:	2005
ISSN:	0165-1765 1873-7374
EISSN:	1873-7374
Discipline:	Economics
Series:	Economics Letters
Subjects:	Matching Hiring cost Hold-up Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences Unemployment Analysis Matching Hold-up Hiring cost E24 J41 hiring cost hold-up matching
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2005 Web of Knowledge Web of Science RePEc RePEc IDEAS CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS