Efficient v.s. equilibrium unemployment with match-specific costs

This paper extends the standard matching model by adding match-specific costs, which can only be partially protected from hold-up because of workers' bargaining power. We show that a decrease in equilibrium unemployment might improve welfare for realistic values of workers' bargaining powe...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 88
Main Author: Cheron, A
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 2005
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Elsevier
published in: Economics letters Vol. 88; no. 2; pp. 176 - 183
Data of publication: 2005
ISSN: 0165-1765
1873-7374
EISSN: 1873-7374
Discipline: Economics
Series: Economics Letters
Subjects:
E24
J41
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2005
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