Collective risk-taking in the commons

•We study the Tragedy of the Commons, in a context where the commons’ capacity is uncertain.•The model is an amended Nash-demand game with an uncertain threshold.•We show that players might collectively be risk-seeking even if each individual is risk averse, whenever the representation of risk is a...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic details
Volume: 163
Main Author: Bochet, Olivier
Laurent-Lucchetti, Jeremy
Leroux, Justin
Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: AMSTERDAM Elsevier B.V 01.07.2019
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
HAL CCSD
published in: Journal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 163; pp. 277 - 296
ORCID: 0000-0001-7316-1444
Data of publication: July 2019
ISSN: 0167-2681
1879-1751
EISSN: 1879-1751
Discipline: Business
Economics
Subjects:
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Knowledge
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index – 2019
Web of Science
CrossRef
Gale General OneFile (A&I only)
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL)
HAL-SHS: Archive ouverte en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
OpenAIRE
OpenAIRE (Open Access)
Database information Databases - DBIS