Wage Increases and the Dynamics of Reciprocity

We investigate how workers' performance is affected by the timing of wages in a real-effort experiment. In all treatments, agents earn the same wage sum, but wage increases are distributed differently over time. We find that agents work harder under increasing wage profiles if they do not know...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 35
Main Author: Sliwka, Dirk
Werner, Peter
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Trade
Academic
Place of publication: CHICAGO University of Chicago Press 01.04.2017
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
published in: Journal of labor economics Vol. 35; no. 2; pp. 299 - 344
Related: Microeconomics & Public Economics
RS: GSBE ETBC
ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165
Data of publication: 2017-4
ISSN: 0734-306X
1537-5307
EISSN: 1537-5307
Discipline: Economics
Subjects:
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: NARCIS:Publications
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NARCIS: Datasets
Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2017
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