Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions

This paper endogenizes in a standard hidden action model the point in time when a risk neutral and wealth constrained agent and the principal observe the realization of an additional signal: before the agent’s effort choice (ex ante information) or after (ex post information). In a decision problem,...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 45
Main Author: Nafziger, Julia
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 2009
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Elsevier
published in: Journal of mathematical economics Vol. 45; no. 11; pp. 751 - 766
ORCID: 0000-0003-3307-3073
Data of publication: 2009
ISSN: 0304-4068
Discipline: Economics
Mathematics
Series: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Subjects:
D86
J33
D82
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2009
Web of Science - Science Citation Index Expanded - 2009
Web of Knowledge
Science Citation Index Expanded
Web of Science
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