Activism mergers

Shareholder value creation from hedge fund activism occurs primarily by influencing takeover outcomes for targeted firms. Controlling for selection decisions, activist interventions substantially increase the probability of a takeover offer. Third-party bids for targets have higher returns, premia,...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 126
Main Author: Boyson, Nicole M
Gantchev, Nickolay
Shivdasani, Anil
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 01.10.2017
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
published in: Journal of financial economics Vol. 126; no. 1; pp. 54 - 73
ORCID: 0000-0002-2702-8383
Data of publication: October 2017
ISSN: 0304-405X
1879-2774
EISSN: 1879-2774
Discipline: Economics
Business
Subjects:
G23
G34
G14
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Web of Knowledge
Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2017
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Gale General OneFile (A&I only)
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
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