HORIZONTAL MERGERS: A SOLUTION OF THE INSIDERS' DILEMMA

We show that in a three-firm infinitely repeated Cournot game, there exists a stick and carrot strategy equilibrium in which an exogenous bilateral horizontal merger is profitable and the incentive to remain out of the merger disappears. In this sub-game perfect equilibrium, the merged entity produc...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 62
Main Author: Cesi, Berardino
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing 01.04.2010
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
published in: Bulletin of economic research Vol. 62; no. 2; pp. 171 - 180
Data of publication: April 2010
ISSN: 0307-3378
1467-8586
EISSN: 1467-8586
Discipline: Economics
Social Sciences (General)
Subjects:
D43
L41
G34
C73
L13
D43
L41
G34
C73
L13
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Istex
Web of Knowledge
Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2010
CrossRef
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
Database information Databases - DBIS