Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion

This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study information transmission in static interactive decision problems, both when the agents monitoring information can lie (“cheap talk”...

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Bibliographic details

Main Author:	Françoise Forges
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Place of publication:	GENES 01.03.2020
published in:	Annals of economics and statistics no. 137; pp. 3 - 30
Data of publication:	20200301
ISSN:	2115-4430 1968-3863
EISSN:	1968-3863
Discipline:	Economics
Subjects:	Probability distributions Repeated games Utility functions Data transmission Nash equilibrium Signals State of nature Cheap talk Game theory Persuasion
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	CrossRef Database information Databases - DBIS