Career Concerns and Belief Precision about Talent
In this paper, we study effort incentives in the labor market when talent is learned over time. We build a career concerns model in which agents can be promoted. We show that effort can increase in the precision of beliefs about talent, unlike the result obtained in the seminal paper of Holmström (1...
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| Main Author: |
Frédéric Loss
Antoine Renucci |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Place of publication: |
GENES 01.09.2020 |
| published in: | Annals of economics and statistics no. 139; pp. 87 - 104 |
| Data of publication: | 20200901 |
| ISSN: |
2115-4430 1968-3863 |
| EISSN: |
1968-3863 |
| Discipline: | Economics |
| Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
| Database: | CrossRef Database information Databases - DBIS |