Career Concerns and Belief Precision about Talent

In this paper, we study effort incentives in the labor market when talent is learned over time. We build a career concerns model in which agents can be promoted. We show that effort can increase in the precision of beliefs about talent, unlike the result obtained in the seminal paper of Holmström (1...

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Bibliographic details
Main Author: Frédéric Loss
Antoine Renucci
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: GENES 01.09.2020
published in: Annals of economics and statistics no. 139; pp. 87 - 104
Data of publication: 20200901
ISSN: 2115-4430
EISSN: 1968-3863
Discipline: Economics
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: CrossRef
Database information Databases - DBIS