Optimal sickness benefits in a principal-agent model

This paper studies the optimal design of sickness benefits in a repeated principal-agent model, where the fraudsters are not observed by the principal. Sickness compensation protects workers against the income fluctuations implied by the risk of illness and its provision is limited by the presence o...

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Bibliographic details
Main Author: Menard, Sebastien
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: NEW YORK SPRINGER 06.01.2021
Springer Verlag
published in: Social choice and welfare
ORCID: 0000-0003-4951-8364
Data of publication: 2021-01-06
ISSN: 0176-1714
EISSN: 1432-217X
Discipline: Economics
Social Welfare & Social Work
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Web of Knowledge
Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science
Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL)
HAL-SHS: Archive ouverte en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
Database information Databases - DBIS