Mandatory Voting, Large Shareholder Power, and Wolf Packs

Our model develops a theory of how the existence of systematic voters who always vote, besides partisans who vote strategically, affects the outcome of general meetings. Depending on the shareholder structure, we show that systematic voting has two opposite consequences on the outcomes of the meetin...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 40
Main Author: Souam, Saïd
Charléty, Patricia
Fagart, Marie-Cécile
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: Presses universitaires de Grenoble 2019
published in: Finance (Paris) Vol. 40; pp. 51 - 76
Data of publication: 2019
ISSN: 0752-6180
EISSN: 2101-0145
Discipline: Business
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL)
HAL-SHS: Archive ouverte en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
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