Package Bidding Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions

The Vickrey and ascending package auctions are found to have identical equilibrium performance in the case where goods are substitutes. In the remaining cases, the Vickrey auction retains its incentive advantages at the cost of setting prices that are so low that the outcome is not in the core of th...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 53
Main Author: Lawrence M. Ausubel
Paul R. Milgrom
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques 01.05.2002
Programme National Persée
published in: Revue économique Vol. 53; no. 3; pp. 391 - 402
Data of publication: 20020501
ISSN: 0035-2764
1950-6694
EISSN: 1950-6694
Discipline: Economics
Series: Revue Économique
Subjects:
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: RePEc
RePEc IDEAS
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