Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

Abstract We characterize when a stable and strategy-proof mechanism is guaranteed to exist in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulability via contractual terms—and show that...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 88
Main Author: Hatfield, John William
Kominers, Scott Duke
Westkamp, Alexander
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: 22.05.2021
published in: The Review of economic studies Vol. 88; no. 3; pp. 1457 - 1502
Data of publication: 2021-05-22
ISSN: 0034-6527
1467-937X
EISSN: 1467-937X
Discipline: Economics
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: CrossRef
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