Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions

We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists of...

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Bibliographic details
Main Author: Bergantiños, Gustavo
Massó, Jordi
Moreno de Barreda, Inés
Neme, Alejandro
Format: Paper
Language: English
Place of publication: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 01.10.2013
Data of publication: 2013-10
Series: Working papers;941.13
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Recercat
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