On Strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked p...
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| Main Author: |
Massó, Jordi
Moreno de Barreda, Inés |
|---|---|
| Format: | Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Place of publication: |
13.05.2010 |
| Data of publication: | 2010-05-13T14:20:16Z |
| Series: |
Working papers; 809.10 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
| Database: | Recercat Database information Databases - DBIS |