The values of ex-ante and ex-post communication in dictator games

In the dictator game, the recipient's opportunity to send a message to the dictator increases giving. This paperreports two experimentswhich study how the timing of messages affects dictators' decisions (experiment 1) and which value recipients attach to communication opportunities (experi...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 2014/7
Main Author: Langenbach, Pascal
Format: Paper
Language: English
Place of publication: Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016
published in: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Vol. 2014/7
Data of publication: 2016
Subjects:
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: EconStor
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