Optimal unemployment insurance for older workers

This paper shows that optimal unemployment insurance contracts are age-dependent. Older workers have only a few years left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	4071
Main Author:	Hairault, Jean-Olivier Langot, François Ménard, Sébastien Sopraseuth, Thepthida
Format:	Paper
Language:	English
Place of publication:	Bonn Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 2009
published in:	IZA discussion papers Vol. 4071
Data of publication:	2009
Subjects:	Altersgrenze Alterssicherung Arbeitslosenversicherung Moral Hazard recursive contracts retirement Theorie Unemployment insurance Vertragstheorie Ältere Arbeitskräfte
Online Access:	Fulltext
Database:	EconStor Database information Databases - DBIS