The values of ex-ante and ex-post communication in dictator games
In the dictator game, the recipient's opportunity to send a message to the dictator increases giving. This paperreports two experimentswhich study how the timing of messages affects dictators' decisions (experiment 1) and which value recipients attach to communication opportunities (experi...
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| Main Author: | Langenbach, Pascal |
|---|---|
| Format: | Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Place of publication: |
Bonn Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods 2014 |
| Data of publication: | 2014 |
| Series: |
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |
| Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
| Database: | ECONIS Database information Databases - DBIS |