Search and Retirement under Asymmetric Information
We consider a labor market where the competitive search equilibrium is inefficient due to asymmetrical information. At the time when firms commit to specific hiring costs, workers hold private information on their intention of entering into retirement before the termination of the contract. When ret...
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Main Author: |
Bi, Sheng
Langot, François |
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Format: | Publication |
Language: | English |
Place of publication: |
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Bonn 01.06.2014 |
Data of publication: | 2014-06-01 |
Classification Codes: | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 |
Discipline: | Economics |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
Database: | OpenAIRE (Open Access) OpenAIRE Database information Databases - DBIS |