Search and Retirement under Asymmetric Information

We consider a labor market where the competitive search equilibrium is inefficient due to asymmetrical information. At the time when firms commit to specific hiring costs, workers hold private information on their intention of entering into retirement before the termination of the contract. When ret...

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Bibliographic details

Main Author:	Bi, Sheng Langot, François
Format:	Publication
Language:	English
Place of publication:	Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Bonn 01.06.2014
Data of publication:	2014-06-01
Classification Codes:
Dewey Decimal Classification:	330
Discipline:	Economics
Subjects:	competitive search equilibrium competitive search equilibrium, separating equilibrium, retirement retirement separating equilibrium
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	OpenAIRE (Open Access) OpenAIRE Database information Databases - DBIS