La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale

Theoretical analysis of the voting rules susceptibility to strategic manipulation suggests that the choice of the best rule (the less vulnerable to manipulation) is closely related to the underlying notion of equilibrium that is used. A crucial question is to know whether or not the possibility of r...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 75
Main Author: Béhue, Virginie
Favardin, Pierre
Lepelley, Dominique
Format: Publication
Language: French
Place of publication: De Boeck Université 01.01.2010
published in: Recherches économiques de Louvain Vol. 75; no. 4; pp. 503 - 516
Data of publication: 2010-01-01
Classification Codes:

Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: OpenAIRE (Open Access)
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