Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and its Application to Ontario

We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include: (1) physicians can ch...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic details
Main Author: Kantarevic, Jasmin
Kralj, Boris
Format: Publication
Language: English
Place of publication: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Bonn 01.06.2015
Data of publication: 2015-06-01
Classification Codes:

Dewey Decimal Classification: 330
Discipline: Economics
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: OpenAIRE (Open Access)
Database information Databases - DBIS