Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers

International audience; This paper studies the optimal unemployment insurance for older workers in a repeated principal-agent model, where the search intensity of risk-averse workers (the agents) is not observed by the risk-neutral insurance agency (the principal). When unemployment benefits are the...

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Bibliographic details

Main Author:	Hairault, Jean-Olivier Langot, François Ménard, Sébastien Sopraseuth, Thepthida
Format:	Publication
Language:	English
Place of publication:	Elsevier 01.06.2012
Data of publication:	2012-06-01
Subjects:	JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers/J.J6.J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers/J.J6.J65 - Unemployment Insurance • Severance Pay • Plant Closings [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Unemployment insurance Recursive contracts JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C61 - Optimization Techniques • Programming Models • Dynamic Analysis Retirement Moral hazard
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	OpenAIRE (Open Access) OpenAIRE Database information Databases - DBIS