Prevention in insurance markets

This paper considers a competitive insurance market under moral hazard and adverse selection, in which preventive efforts and self-protection costs are unobservable by insurance companies. Under reasonable assumptions, the conclusions of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) are preserved in our context ev...

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Bibliographic details
Main Author: Fagart, Marie-Cecile
Kambia-Chopin, Bidénam
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: ENSAE 2006
published in: Annales d'Economie et de Statistique no. 82; pp. 55 - 70
Data of publication: 2006
Series: Annales d'Economie et de Statistique
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: RePEc IDEAS
RePEc
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