No-Show Paradoxes under Parliamentary Agendas
It may happen that the favorite candidate of a voter loses an election if that voter votes honestly, but gets elected if the voter abstains. Such a situation is known in the social choice literature under the name of « no-show paradox ». This paper is devoted to the evaluation of the likelihood of t...
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Main Author: |
Boniface, MBIH
Xingyu, ZHAO |
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Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Place of publication: |
ENSAE 2011 |
published in: | Annales d'Economie et de Statistique no. 101; pp. 127 - 148 |
Data of publication: | 2011 |
Series: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique |
Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
Database: | RePEc RePEc IDEAS Database information Databases - DBIS |