Optimal Health Care Contract under Physician Agency
We model asymmetric information arising from physician agency and its effect on the design of payment and health care quantity. The physician aims to maximize a combination of physician profit and patient benefit. The degree of substitution between profit and patient benefit in the physician agency...
Saved in:
| Main Author: |
Philippe, CHONÉ
Ma, Ching-to Albert |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Place of publication: |
ENSAE 2011 |
| published in: | Annales d'Economie et de Statistique no. 101; pp. 229 - 256 |
| Data of publication: | 2011 |
| Series: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique |
| Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
| Database: | RePEc RePEc IDEAS Database information Databases - DBIS |