Adverse Selection, Emission Permits and Optimal Price Differentiation

In this paper, we focus on the adverse selection issue that prevails when the regulator is not able to observe the type of the abatement costs of the firms. The regulator decides the total level of emission that minimizes the expected social cost of pollution and she sells them to the firms. In an e...

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Bibliographic details
Main Author: Sandrine, SPAETER
Mourad, AFIF
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: ENSAE 2011
published in: Annales d'Economie et de Statistique no. 103; pp. 93 - 106
Data of publication: 2011
Series: Annales d'Economie et de Statistique
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: RePEc
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