Adverse Selection, Emission Permits and Optimal Price Differentiation
In this paper, we focus on the adverse selection issue that prevails when the regulator is not able to observe the type of the abatement costs of the firms. The regulator decides the total level of emission that minimizes the expected social cost of pollution and she sells them to the firms. In an e...
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| Main Author: |
Sandrine, SPAETER
Mourad, AFIF |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Place of publication: |
ENSAE 2011 |
| published in: | Annales d'Economie et de Statistique no. 103; pp. 93 - 106 |
| Data of publication: | 2011 |
| Series: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique |
| Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
| Database: | RePEc RePEc IDEAS Database information Databases - DBIS |