Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'information sur l'aversion au risque des parties
This paper studies in a model à la Bebchuk how the existence of an asymmetric information on the risk aversion of parties engaged in a trial affects the way they litigate. We first consider the situation where the plaintiff is the informed party, and solve for the equilibrium with and without pre-tr...
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| Volume: | 74 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | LANGLAIS, Eric |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Place of publication: |
De Boeck Université 2008 |
| published in: | Recherches économiques de Louvain Vol. 74; no. 2; pp. 191 - 218 |
| Data of publication: | 2008 |
| Series: |
Recherches économiques de Louvain |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
| Database: | RePEc RePEc IDEAS Database information Databases - DBIS |