Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'information sur l'aversion au risque des parties

This paper studies in a model à la Bebchuk how the existence of an asymmetric information on the risk aversion of parties engaged in a trial affects the way they litigate. We first consider the situation where the plaintiff is the informed party, and solve for the equilibrium with and without pre-tr...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 74
Main Author: LANGLAIS, Eric
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: De Boeck Université 2008
published in: Recherches économiques de Louvain Vol. 74; no. 2; pp. 191 - 218
Data of publication: 2008
Series: Recherches économiques de Louvain
Subjects:
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: RePEc
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