Threat of Exit as a Source of Bargaining Power

This article analyzes a simple two-period model where two homogenous manufacturers compete to supply a monopolist retailer. We show that if manufacturers are vulnerable (i.e if they are likely to exit the market in case of insufficient orders in the first period), they may exploit their threat of ex...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 75
Main Author: Chambolle, Claire
Bergès, Fabian
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: De Boeck Université 2009
published in: Recherches économiques de Louvain Vol. 75; no. 3; pp. 353 - 368
Data of publication: 2009
Series: Recherches économiques de Louvain
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: RePEc
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