Threat of Exit as a Source of Bargaining Power
This article analyzes a simple two-period model where two homogenous manufacturers compete to supply a monopolist retailer. We show that if manufacturers are vulnerable (i.e if they are likely to exit the market in case of insufficient orders in the first period), they may exploit their threat of ex...
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Volume: | 75 |
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Main Author: |
Chambolle, Claire
Bergès, Fabian |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Place of publication: |
De Boeck Université 2009 |
published in: | Recherches économiques de Louvain Vol. 75; no. 3; pp. 353 - 368 |
Data of publication: | 2009 |
Series: |
Recherches économiques de Louvain |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
Database: | RePEc RePEc IDEAS Database information Databases - DBIS |