La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote: une étude expérimentale
Theoretical analysis of the voting rules susceptibility to strategic manipulation suggests that the choice of the best rule (the less vulnerable to manipulation) is closely related to the underlying notion of equilibrium that is used. A crucial question is to know whether or not the possibility of r...
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| Volume: | 75 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: |
Béhue, Virginie
Favardin, Pierre Lepelley, Dominique |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Place of publication: |
De Boeck Université 2009 |
| published in: | Recherches économiques de Louvain Vol. 75; no. 4; pp. 503 - 516 |
| Data of publication: | 2009 |
| Series: |
Recherches économiques de Louvain |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
| Database: | RePEc RePEc IDEAS Database information Databases - DBIS |