La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote: une étude expérimentale

Theoretical analysis of the voting rules susceptibility to strategic manipulation suggests that the choice of the best rule (the less vulnerable to manipulation) is closely related to the underlying notion of equilibrium that is used. A crucial question is to know whether or not the possibility of r...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 75
Main Author: Béhue, Virginie
Favardin, Pierre
Lepelley, Dominique
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: De Boeck Université 2009
published in: Recherches économiques de Louvain Vol. 75; no. 4; pp. 503 - 516
Data of publication: 2009
Series: Recherches économiques de Louvain
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: RePEc
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