On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-Peakedness
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single peaked p...
Saved in:
| Main Author: |
de Barreda, Inés Moreno
Massé, Jordi |
|---|---|
| Format: | Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Place of publication: |
01.01.2010 |
| Related: |
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics |
| Data of publication: | 2010/01 |
| Series: |
Working Papers |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
| Database: | RePEc RePEc IDEAS Database information Databases - DBIS |