Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds

Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models in which signalling incentives are important. First, because incumbents only care about clearing a reelection hurdle, si...

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Bibliographic details
Main Author: Caselli, Francesco
Morelli, Massimo
Moreno de Barreda, Inés
Cunningham, Tom
Format: Paper
Language: English
Place of publication: 01.02.2012
Related: C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Data of publication: 2012/02
Series: CEPR Discussion Papers
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: RePEc
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