Long Persuasion Games

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterizati...

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Bibliographic details
Main Author: Forges, Francoise
Koessler, Frederic
Format: Paper
Language: English
Place of publication: 01.02.2006
Related: THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Data of publication: 2006/02
Series: THEMA Working Papers
Subjects:
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: RePEc IDEAS
RePEc
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