On the performance of the Shapley Shubik and Banzhaf power indices for the allocations of mandates

A classical problem in the power index literature is to design a voting mechanism such as the distribution of power of the different players is equal (or closer) to a pre established target. This tradition is especially popular when considering two tiers voting mechanisms: each player votes in his o...

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Bibliographic details
Main Author: Mathieu, MARTIN
Barthélémy, Fabrice
Merlin, Vincent R
Format: Paper
Language: English
Place of publication: 2007
Related: THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Data of publication: 2007
Series: THEMA Working Papers
Subjects:
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: RePEc IDEAS
RePEc
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