Testing for the cartel in OPEC: non-cooperative collusion or just non-cooperative?

This paper extends the framework of Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983a) to encompass the case of a cartel (OPEC) faced by a competitive fringe (non-OPEC oil producers). Estimation of a simultaneous equation switching regression model allows us to examine which market structure better characte...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 27
Main Author: Almoguera, Pedro A
Douglas, Christopher C
Herrera, Ana María
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: Oxford University Press 2011
published in: Oxford Review of Economic Policy Vol. 27; no. 1; pp. 144 - 168
Data of publication: 2011
Series: Oxford Review of Economic Policy
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: RePEc IDEAS
RePEc
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