The Incumbency Effects of Signalling

Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re-election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a re-election hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 81
Main Author: Caselli, Fransesco
Cunningham, Tom
Morelli, Massimo
de Barreda, Inés Moreno
Format: Publication
Language: English
Place of publication: 2014
published in: Economica Vol. 81; no. 323; p. 397
Data of publication: 2014
ISSN: 0013-0427
EISSN: 1468-0335
Discipline: Economics
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Database information not found
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