The Incumbency Effects of Signalling
Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re-election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a re-election hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above...
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| Volume: | 81 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: |
Caselli, Fransesco
Cunningham, Tom Morelli, Massimo de Barreda, Inés Moreno |
| Format: | Publication |
| Language: | English |
| Place of publication: |
2014 |
| published in: | Economica Vol. 81; no. 323; p. 397 |
| Data of publication: | 2014 |
| ISSN: |
0013-0427 1468-0335 1468-0335 |
| EISSN: |
1468-0335 |
| Discipline: | Economics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Fulltext |
| Database: | Database information not found Database information Databases - DBIS |