Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems : The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions

We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists of...

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Bibliographic details
Main Author: Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo
Massó, Jordi
Moreno de Barreda, Inés
Neme, Alejandro
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: 2015
Data of publication: 2015
Bibliography: 000363258800004
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AGAUR/2009/SGR-419
oai:ddd.uab.cat:182478
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/SEV-2011-0075
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN/ECO2011-23460
Theory and decision ; Vol. 79, Núm. 2 (2015), p. 227-250
85028220688
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AGAUR/2014/SGR-515
oai:egreta.uab.cat:publications/68e89b92-09f0-4077-a241-2f3c64426b51
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/182478
10.1007/s11238-014-9467-7
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/ECO2008-0475-FEDER
ARE-85223
00405833v79p227
Subjects:
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: UAB Digital Repository
Database information Databases - DBIS