Delegation with a Reciprocal Agent

We consider a model in which a principal may delegate the choice of a project to a better informed agent. The preferences of the agent and the principal about which project should be undertaken may be discordant. Moreover, the agent benefits from being granted more discretion in the project choice a...

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Bibliographic details
Main Author: De Chiara, Alessandro
Manna, Ester
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: Oxford University Press 01.11.2019
Data of publication: 2019-11
ISSN: 8756-6222
EISSN: 1465-7341
Discipline: Economics
Bibliography: Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 2019, vol. 35, num. 3, p. 651-695
Versió postprint del document publicat a:
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Diposit Digital de la Universitat de Barcelona
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