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Team incentives, task assignment, and performance: a field experiment

Josse Delfgaauw (Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute), Robert Dur (Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute, CESifo and IZA), Michiel Souverijn (Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

The performance of a work team commonly depends on the effort exerted by the team members as well as on the division of tasks among them. However, when leaders assign tasks to team members, performance is usually not the only consideration. Favouritism, employees' seniority, employees' pre...

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Bibliographic details
Main Author: Delfgaauw, Josse
Dur, Robert A. J
Souverijn, Michiel
Format: eBook
Language: English
Related: Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ¬[Herausgebendes Organ]
Ort : Verlag : ErscheinungsdatumBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics : December 2017
Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten) : Illustrationen, Diagramme
Umfang: (Dateityp; Kodierungsformat)Textdatei; PDF
Series: Discussion paper series / IZA Institute of Labor Economics ; no. 11228
Links: Fulltext
HBZ-ID: HT019555349 » further libraries in North Rhine-Westphalia
Database: ULB Bonn